



General Assembly

Fiftieth Session

46th plenary meeting

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Official Records

President: Mr. Freitas do Amaral (Portugal)

In the absence of the President, Mr. Abulhasan (Kuwait), Vice-President, took the Chair.
The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

Agenda item 12

Report of the Economic and Social Council: report of the Second Committee (Part I) (A/50/615)

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): The Assembly will now turn to Part I of the report (A/50/615) of the Second Committee on agenda item 12, "Report of the Economic and Social Council", dealing with revision of the General Regulations of the World Food Programme and reconstitution of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes as the Executive Board of the World Food Programme.

In this connection, I should like to draw the attention of members to a note by the Secretary-General on the same subject, which is contained in document A/50/706.

I request the Rapporteur of the Second Committee, Mr. Basheer Zoubi of Jordan, to introduce the report of the Second Committee.

Mr. Zoubi (Jordan), Rapporteur of the Second Committee: I have the honour to present part I of the report of the Second Committee on agenda item 12, entitled "Report of the Economic and Social Council", which is contained in document A/50/615.

In paragraph 5 of this document, the Second Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of a draft resolution entitled "Revision of the General Regulations of the World Food Programme and reconstitution of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes as the Executive Board of the World Food Programme". The draft resolution was adopted by the Committee without a vote.

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): Before taking action on the draft resolution, I wish to point out that paragraph 1 would have the General Assembly decide, *inter alia*, subject to the concurrence of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), to reconstitute the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes as the Executive Board of the World Food Programme.

In that connection, as indicated by the Secretary-General in document A/50/706, the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) adopted on Tuesday, 31 October 1995, by consensus, a resolution parallel to the draft resolution now before the Assembly. In that resolution, the FAO Conference decided, subject to the concurrence of the Assembly, that the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes should be reconstituted as the Executive Board of the World Food Programme.

If there is no proposal under rule 66 of the rules of procedure, I shall take it that the General Assembly



decides not to discuss the report of the Second Committee which is before the Assembly today.

It was so decided.

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): Statements will therefore be limited to explanations of vote. The positions of delegations regarding the recommendation of the Second Committee have been made clear in the Committee and are reflected in the relevant official records.

Before we begin to take action on the recommendation contained in the report of the Second Committee, I should like to advise representatives that we are going to proceed to take a decision in the same manner as was done in the Committee.

The Assembly has before it a draft resolution which is contained in paragraph 5 of Part I of the report of the Second Committee (A/50/615). The draft resolution is entitled "Revision of the General Regulations of the World Food Programme and reconstitution of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes as the Executive Board of the World Food Programme".

The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended for adoption by the Second Committee in paragraph 5 of its report. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to adopt the draft resolution?

The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 50/8).

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): The General Assembly has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of agenda item 12.

Agenda item 133

Financing of the United Nations Mission in Haiti: report of the Fifth Committee (A/50/705)

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): If there is no proposal under rule 66 of the rules of procedure, I shall take it that the Assembly decides not to discuss the report of the Fifth Committee that is before the Assembly today.

It was so decided.

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): Statements will therefore be limited to explanations of vote.

The positions of delegations regarding the recommendation of the Fifth Committee have been made clear in the Committee and are reflected in the relevant official records.

Before we begin to take action on the recommendation contained in the report of the Fifth Committee, I should like to advise representatives that we are going to proceed to take a decision in the same manner as was done in the Fifth Committee.

The Assembly will now take a decision on the draft decision recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 5 of its report (A/50/705). The draft decision was adopted by the Fifth Committee without a vote.

May I consider that the Assembly too wishes to adopt the draft decision?

The draft decision was adopted.

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): We have thus concluded this stage of our consideration of agenda item 133.

Agenda item 14

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Agency (A/50/360)

Draft resolution (A/50/L.11)

Amendment (A/50/L.12)

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to propose that the list of speakers in the debate on this item be closed today at noon.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Assembly agrees to this proposal.

It was so decided.

The Acting President (*interpretation from Arabic*): I therefore request representatives wishing to participate in the debate to place their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible.

I now invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, to present the report of the Agency for the year 1994.

Mr. Blix (Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)): On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations it might be appropriate to review some of the main achievements and challenges facing the international community in the field of competence of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was created to foster international cooperation in the field of the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy.

International efforts to promote the peaceful application of nuclear energy and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons have resulted in the non-proliferation regime, with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at its centre and with the IAEA providing the function of verifying compliance with non-proliferation pledges.

In May of this year the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely. That decision underlined the broad and solid commitment of the then 178 Parties to the Treaty. In my view, the extension decision, and the Principles and Objectives and the strengthened review process that were also adopted should be read as a collective commitment to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy and to the renunciation of nuclear weapons, a commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire such weapons and a commitment by the weapon States to nuclear disarmament with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons.

The outcome of the NPT Conference has far-reaching implications for the future work of the IAEA. The Agency's role as a centre for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was confirmed, and the IAEA was expressly recognized as the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements. The Conference called on Parties to the NPT with concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards agreements to direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA for it to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. The Conference further called for support for the Agency's efforts to strengthen safeguards and to develop its capability to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. I take this as a sign of trust in the Agency's existing role in the field of verification.

The Conference also expressed its support for an expanded the IAEA role in verification. It recommended that nuclear material released from military use should be placed under the IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable and that safeguards should be universally applied once the elimination of nuclear weapons has been completed.

The NPT Conference called for the early conclusion of an agreement to end the production of nuclear material for weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and endorsed the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones. It also set 1996 as the target date for the completion of a nuclear test ban, universally recognized as a vital component of the non-proliferation regime and an important step towards nuclear disarmament. There is an emerging consensus that the IAEA safeguards would be an essential element on the verification of a cut-off agreement. It is also expected, if the existing nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements are an indication, that the Agency would have a verification role in any future nuclear-weapon-free zone.

With regard to a comprehensive test ban, it is relevant to note that such a ban — verified by the IAEA — is already in force for the more than 170 non-nuclear-weapon States that have accepted comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities. These States are obliged not to use any nuclear material for explosions, and the IAEA safeguards are required to verify that this obligation is respected. What role the Agency might be asked to assume under a comprehensive test-ban treaty is still a matter of discussion at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. Entrusting the IAEA with the function of verifying a comprehensive test-ban treaty would undoubtedly save resources, which would seem natural at a time when efforts are urged to avoid duplication, overlap and unnecessary cost in the United Nations family. It would also permit more rapid implementation.

Credible IAEA verification of States' compliance with their nuclear-arms-control pledges is becoming an increasingly important factor in global security and nuclear disarmament. The lessons of Iraq and the increasing demands placed on the IAEA safeguards have necessitated the strengthening of the safeguards system and making it more cost-effective. In particular, Governments and the public now demand that the IAEA safeguards system should have the capacity to detect any secret, undeclared nuclear material and installations. There is also a greater understanding and readiness to accept that such verification must include no-notice

inspections, greater freedom of movement for the inspectors and use of the most modern means of detection and communication.

The Agency's efforts to develop a strengthened safeguards system have focused on three essential elements: first, increased access to information about a State's nuclear activities; secondly, broader access to sites and locations within a State; and, thirdly, maximum use of new and available technologies to increase detection capacity and, in due course, to reduce the frequency of on-site inspections. I am pleased to note that the Agency's Board of Governors has already accepted the first part of the Agency programme to strengthen its safeguards system, the so-called Programme "93 + 2". The secretariat is in a position to implement these new measures after the required consultation with Member States. The second part of the programme, which relates to measures requiring additional legal authority, is due for consideration by the Agency's Board of Governors within a few months. The test of any new measure is that it enhances the effectiveness of the system and is cost-effective. Experience gained in field trials of some of the new measures suggests that they can be implemented without much additional intrusion or cost to States.

On the other hand, a significant increase in the IAEA verification efforts in terms of cost and resources may result if nuclear material released from the military programmes of nuclear-weapon States is placed under the IAEA safeguards, as urged by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Verification of some such material released from the weapons programme of the United States was started a year ago. These expanded efforts would require new arrangements to ensure that the released material would permanently remain under safeguards and that the financing of such verification was assured.

Last year I reported that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not in full compliance with its safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT. This continues to be the case. In the framework that was agreed between the DPRK and the United States on 21 October 1994, the DPRK agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and stated its intention eventually to come into full compliance with the safeguards agreement. As the Assembly is aware, the Security Council, confirming that the DPRK safeguards agreement remains in force and binding, requested the Agency to take the necessary steps to monitor the freeze.

With the authorization of the Board, we have been doing this, *inter alia*, through the maintenance of a continuous presence of Agency inspectors in the DPRK. I can confirm that the freeze has been put into effect and has been maintained to date. For the DPRK to come into full compliance with the safeguards agreement, however, it must enable the Agency to verify effectively the accuracy and completeness of its declaration of nuclear material subject to safeguards. Until this cooperation — long overdue — comes about, it is essential that all necessary steps be taken to preserve information that may be relevant to the eventual verification of the DPRK's initial declaration.

Technical meetings have been held with the DPRK on a number of occasions to discuss activities that are required by the Agency for it to fulfil its obligations under the safeguards agreement, including monitoring the freeze. Since the first of these discussions in November last year, arrangements have been made which enable the Agency to meet many of its obligations. However, a number of issues remain to be resolved, including the measures required for the preservation of information.

Let me now turn to Iraq. As I reported to the General Assembly last year, it is our conclusion that the essential components of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapon programme have been identified and destroyed, removed or rendered harmless. This assessment was based not on faith in Iraqi statements but on data gathered during inspection, on information provided by the suppliers and Member States and, to a great extent, on analysis of the large number of original documents which were obtained in Iraq early in the inspection process. Since August 1994 the IAEA inspectors have been continuously present in Iraq to carry out ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. This does not exclude the further conduct of inspections for the purpose of investigation, should such an investigation be called for, for example to verify new information.

Recently, the IAEA received additional information on Iraq's former nuclear-weapons programme by way of new declarations, voluminous documents and other materials which were transmitted to the IAEA and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) by Iraq following the departure of the former Iraqi Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization. What we have been told is that in 1990 Iraqi authorities instituted a crash project to take safeguarded highly enriched research reactor fuel and transform the fissile material for use in

a nuclear weapon. It is uncertain whether Iraq would have been able to overcome the considerable technical difficulties involved in this project. As it was, the project was made impossible by damage inflicted on the nuclear research centre at Tuwaitha by the January 1991 bombing, and the safeguarded nuclear fuel was fully accounted for in the IAEA post-war inspection. The new Iraqi declarations, along with all the documents and materials to which I have referred, are currently being carefully examined for any new data. What can be concluded at this stage is that Iraq's withholding of information, documents and materials clearly constitutes a breach of Iraqi obligations under Security Council resolutions and that the crash programme was in violation of the safeguards agreement and the NPT.

As requested last year by the Agency's General Conference, the Agency has continued to assist the African States in their effort to establish an African nuclear-weapon-free zone and in particular to help elaborate its verification regime. A draft treaty text which, *inter alia*, entrusts the Agency with the task of verification was adopted by the African Heads of State in Addis Ababa last June and is now before the General Assembly. We look forward to performing the verification role in an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The General Conference of the IAEA continues to call upon all parties directly concerned in the Middle East to consider taking the practical and appropriate steps required to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region. This year's resolution again requested the Director General to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region and the preparation of model verification agreements as a step toward the establishment of such a zone. I intend to continue my visits to and consultations with States in the region in order further to explore the verification questions and the material obligations which may be agreed upon and which may call for verification.

For the last two years the international community has been expressing alarm at the number of incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials as well as other radioactive sources. Although the reported cases in 1995 show a decreasing trend, this is no cause for complacency. It is clear that greater efforts are needed and that States must pay increased attention to the physical protection of all radioactive material — and especially weapons-useable nuclear material — whether in use, transport or storage. While the primary responsibility in the field of illegal

trafficking falls upon the State concerned, authorities in many countries, as well as a number of international organizations, are seeking to strengthen and coordinate their efforts to better protect and control radioactive materials. The IAEA has recently hosted a large inter-agency meeting for that purpose.

Within the IAEA, a plan of action has been put in place. The Agency is establishing a data base of trafficking incidents to provide factual information to Member States' Governments and to the public. Further, as effective national accounting and protection is the basic prerequisite for preventing nuclear material from falling into unauthorized hands, the Agency is conducting training courses in the implementation of State systems of accounting and control of nuclear material and in physical protection methods and technology. With the assistance of many donor countries, the Agency has also coordinated technical support efforts in the upgrading of physical protection of nuclear material in the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union.

Since the Chernobyl accident, the Agency's role in the field of nuclear safety has been gradually expanding. In addition to the sharing of information and the development of safety guidelines and standards, the Agency has moved progressively in the field of providing advisory services to member States, such as the Operational Safety Advisory Review Teams, which provide expert services in assessing and advising on operational safety of power reactors, and the Analysis of Safety-Significant Events Teams. Agency work on assessment of the safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union has continued; an international consensus now exists on the major safety issues and their significance for each of the various reactor types. The emphasis is now shifting to a review of the status of implementation of the proposed safety improvements and to the collection of up-to-date information on the upgrading situation at each of the reactors involved. The results of our work provide input into bilateral and multilateral assistance projects coordinated by the G-24 mechanisms in Brussels.

The decision to operate — or not to operate — a reactor is a national prerogative. The IAEA has not been given any supranational competence in this regard. However, the Agency continues to provide, upon request, expert advice on the safety of reactors and on safety improvements needed. On some occasions the Agency has advised that it would be imprudent for a particular

reactor to operate unless safety improvements were ensured.

No nuclear accident has been the subject of more analysis, as regards both its causes and its consequences, than the one at Chernobyl. Even so — or perhaps precisely for this reason — the accounts and explanations vary considerably, especially as to the radiological impact of the accident on the health of the affected people and the environment. It is evidently desirable that this impact be scientifically established, as is the radiological impact of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the tragic accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, in April 1996, the Agency, and several other organizations — for instance, the World Health Organization and the European Union — are organizing in April next year an international conference to seek a common understanding of the nature and magnitude of the consequences of that accident. Let me add, however, that while such understanding is highly desirable, there is no reason for anybody to delay action and assistance to alleviate the situation of the people concerned. Many enquiries following the Chernobyl accident have documented the distressing situation in which they live.

In the field of nuclear power safety, the IAEA has long issued recommendations based on best experience and practice. More recently the Agency has also moved to develop binding international safety standards. This is a clear manifestation of the increased interest of the international community that nuclear safety be at a high level everywhere. There is a growing realization that an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere. A major accomplishment was the adoption in June last year of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. So far the Convention has been signed by 59 States. It may be expected to enter into force next year. This month representatives of signatories of the Convention and other interested States will hold their second meeting to discuss matters relating to the implementation process.

Still in the field of nuclear safety and security, let me note that these subjects will be taken up at a summit meeting to be hosted in Russia next spring. It is to be hoped that the summit will give political impetus to work in the field of nuclear safety and security, thereby reducing risks and making nuclear power more broadly acceptable to the public.

Nuclear waste disposal remains a major concern among the public in many countries. This concern might

lessen when Governments and industry have actually established repositories for wastes of different levels of radioactivity. From the scientific and technical standpoint there are no serious obstacles to the building of repositories which remain safe for extremely long periods of time. The selection of disposal sites, however, often meets with opposition. We can only place our faith in the effect of rational argument. An open dialogue with the public is required. The IAEA continues to be active in the field of radioactive waste management, including providing assistance to developing States in building up infrastructures for waste management, and promoting the minimization, safe processing, storage and disposal of radioactive wastes. I am pleased to report that work has already started on the preparation of a convention on the safe management of radioactive waste, providing binding standards. Significant progress has been made, and it is to be hoped that a final draft could perhaps be ready some time next year.

One of the greatest challenges facing the international community is to find the proper means of providing sufficient energy for sustainable development — that is to say providing energy without unacceptable damage to the environment. Experts have concluded that goals to stabilize carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels are not attainable by the year 2000 under present conditions. In national action reports prepared by parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change many countries report that they will not achieve the goals that they have set for themselves, goals that they have already agreed are not adequate for the long term. Indeed, looking around the world we can easily see how the need for development and the correlated need for greater energy use is leading to the construction of ever more installations burning coal, oil and gas. Extensive analysis of energy options is clearly needed if we are to resolve the dilemma between development and preservation of the environment.

It is not very meaningful to analyse the economic and ecological aspects of any given energy option in isolation. All sources and uses of energy have their risks — as, indeed, an absence of energy carries risks. Only an analysis of different options side by side can tell us which energy policy is economically and ecologically least burdensome. The IAEA is cooperating with several international organizations in drawing up methodologies and data bases for comparative assessment of different options for the production of electric power. An international symposium addressed this issue in Vienna last month. This is an area where difficult policy

decisions must be taken. Governments need to devise long-term energy policies that are economically and ecologically acceptable. Solar power, wind power, biomass and other renewables will bring a valuable but minor contribution to the global energy supply within the next few decades. There is scope for more efficient energy use, and it should be promoted. However, in most places it will not offset the need for additional energy and it is evident that developing countries will need energy in much greater amounts. There are no new energy sources on the horizon that can magically meet these needs. Fusion is still very distant.

Expansion of nuclear power, which now provides about 8 per cent of the world's energy and 17 per cent of its electricity, could provide a part of the solution on the supply side without increasing emissions of carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide or nitrogen oxides. The main obstacle to increased use of nuclear energy is public concern with safety, radioactive waste and non-proliferation. Any particular energy mix chosen has to be based on comparative risk assessment of the various sources of energy and will need to be thoroughly explained to the public. The IAEA, for its part, will continue to make available the data that are relevant in this regard, and factual information relevant to nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and non-proliferation.

Few developing countries have a technological level and infrastructure that would allow them to make use of the present type of nuclear power reactors. It is to be hoped that, in the future, smaller and less costly nuclear reactors will become available for use by developing countries for the generation of electricity and perhaps also in the desalination of water to compensate for scarce fresh water resources. Developing countries members of the IAEA are keenly interested in these questions. It is obvious that the rapidly increasing number of cities with more than a million, even more than 10 million, inhabitants in developing countries cannot be provided with electricity generated by, say, solar cells, windmills or biomass. Their real choice for decades to come will be between fossil fuels and nuclear power.

At present, only a few developing countries use nuclear power. However, most of them are intensely interested in non-power nuclear techniques that may help their development, and the IAEA is engaged in assisting the transfer of such techniques. Emphasis is being placed on techniques that will contribute to sustainable development, food production and preservation, the harnessing of freshwater resources, industrial uses and the

promotion of human health. The Agency has recently undertaken several initiatives to strengthen its technical cooperation programme and to make it more effective and more relevant to sustainable development. Working together with member States, the secretariat has started preparing country programme frameworks which will help to focus the technical cooperation programmes on key areas of Government priority, with fewer but better-focused projects. Another measure planned is the promotion of technical cooperation among developing countries, with the aim of subcontracting institutions in developing countries recognized as centres of excellence in a particular field to implement selected technical cooperation projects.

At the Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, all participants acknowledged the importance of the work of the Agency as the principal instrument for the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries, and welcomed the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and cooperation programmes. It was also recognized that the success of these programmes depends on the availability of predictable resources. I sincerely hope that the States members of the Agency will pay their contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund in full and in time to enable the Agency to continue to perform its development mission successfully.

During this fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations I cannot close my statement to the General Assembly without some comments on coordination within the United Nations family of organizations and on effectiveness and efficiency. In both respects, severe criticism has been voiced.

That coordination is difficult in a vast system of organizations, authorities and administrations is no novelty to national Governments, many of which have experience of similar problems, though they have the advantage of a central Government and a legislature. Within the United Nations family, action by the Economic and Social Council and the Administrative Committee on Coordination, and under informal contacts and arrangements, can help to harmonize activities and prevent some overlap. The most important contacts between the IAEA and the United Nations occur in cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements. The cases of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have given us much experience in cooperation.

The Administrative Committee on Coordination, under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, is increasingly — and, I think, with some success — trying to ensure effective system-wide responses in matters such as sustainable development, African development and the role of women, that are relevant in all or most organizations. The technique, recently employed, of indicating lead agencies for certain questions may prove helpful.

Effective action by organizations in the United Nations family is in many cases directly dependent on the degree of cooperation that can be achieved between Member States. However, there is also much action that is undertaken mainly by the secretariats. Here, effectiveness depends largely upon the same factors as those which influence efficiency: the availability of adequate and predictable resources, the cooperation of States that may be affected, and — last but not least — the competence and skill of management and staff in the secretariats. We stand or fall on the quality of our management and staff. This is true of the IAEA and, I am sure, of the other organizations in the United Nations family.

The Agency has some unique features, which continue to serve us well in staffing, but which may also deter some qualified experts from joining us. Professional staff in the IAEA are not recruited for a career, but for a period of five to seven years. This policy of rotation has been followed to ensure a continuous influx of talents fresh from laboratories, nuclear installations and other institutions — talents abreast of the latest developments in their field. To have the respect and cooperation of the experts with whom our staff interact in member States, our professional staff must be on a par with the national experts.

I am not suggesting that there is a direct correlation between remuneration and work delivery. However, there is not the slightest doubt that when the pros and cons of employment in an international organization are being weighed, remuneration, home leave, education grants for children, pension benefits, and so on, have a very significant impact on potential candidates and, hence, on our ability to recruit staff of the highest calibre.

In this regard, the IAEA and other organizations are dependent upon the so-called United Nations common system of remuneration, to which we have adhered. This system, as it now stands, falls short on several counts. Let me give the Assembly just a few illustrations. We have general service staff who turn down offers of posts at the professional level because acceptance would lower their salary. Since 1984, professional remuneration in Vienna

has lost about 20 per cent of its purchasing power. A senior energy economist who goes from the Agency to the World Bank may expect a salary 40 per cent higher; a safeguards inspector who leaves the Agency, in Vienna, for the European Atomic Energy Community, in Luxembourg, may expect his income to increase by at least a third. We do not know how many candidates refrain from applying for a job in the Agency because they are offered better conditions elsewhere, but we know that only 4 to 6 per cent of those who currently apply for jobs with us meet our exacting recruitment standards.

As Director General of the IAEA, I joined other executive heads in issuing a statement, recently adopted by the Administrative Committee on Coordination, which, *inter alia*, endorses the salary increases recommended by the International Civil Service Commission. These would bring United Nations remuneration into the middle of the margin range approved by the General Assembly. However, such a step — in itself urgently needed — would subsequently have to be supplemented by a longer-term strategy of restoring competitiveness.

An improvement in the remuneration system is not a panacea for all the management problems that United Nations organizations face. It might even look to some an odd response to a critical financial situation and to sharp criticism for waste and inefficiency. I would submit, however, that the remuneration system is part of the present problem. Unless management is given the ability and freedom to recruit professional staff of the highest calibre, from anywhere in the world — and this can be done only if remuneration is internationally competitive and if Governments refrain from interfering in a fair selection process — it will be hard, if not impossible, to achieve the continuous improvement in quality and efficiency that is rightly called for in the secretariats of United Nations organizations.

I am sorry to bring these mundane matters before delegations, but this body — the General Assembly — not only lays down political guidance for us in Vienna but also decides on employment and other conditions that directly affect our ability and that of other international organizations to fulfil the mandates they have been given.

Let me end on a positive note by telling the Assembly that Vienna, although in some respects an expensive city, is an excellent work station, and the

Austrian Government and the city of Vienna the friendliest of hosts.

The Acting President: I call on the representative of the Netherlands to introduce draft resolution A/50/L.11.

Mr. Dumoré (Netherlands): It is my honour and pleasure to present draft resolution A/50/L.11, on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, on behalf of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

The traditional General Assembly resolution on the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is about the Agency's recent and prospective activities and is meant to endorse these important activities as well as to comment on them. In this introduction, I will only point out the few changes from General Assembly resolution 49/65 that have been incorporated into this new draft resolution.

The third preambular paragraph is a new paragraph that has been lifted *in toto* from the NPT Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in order to introduce more consensus language with regard to safeguards into the text.

The ninth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 7 have been inserted into the text to bring it into line with the consensus language stemming from the General Conference of the Agency in Vienna.

The tenth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 6 also represent an update of the resolution based on developments and General Conference resolutions in Vienna.

The twelfth preambular paragraph takes account of GC(39)/RES/20 and deals with women in the secretariat; this is an addition inspired by the recent Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.

It is important that the resolution on the Agency's annual report attract wide support. All Agency member States have common interests in ensuring that the work of the Agency in all areas — including safeguards, technical assistance, radiation safety, and so on — receives due recognition. The cosponsors of draft resolution A/50/L.11 believe that this annual resolution is particularly helpful for the important work performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in all fields, and recommend that it be adopted with the broadest possible support in its original, unamended form.

Mr. Laclaustra (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic associate themselves with this statement.

At the outset, I wish to express our gratitude for the work carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1994 and to date in 1995, as described in its annual report for 1994 and in the additional information just provided by the Director General of the IAEA. We commend the Director General and the secretariat of the Agency for their efforts, which have made possible an expanded programme despite limited resources.

The European Union is aware of the importance of the various elements that make up the programme of work of the IAEA in accordance with its statutory functions, in particular in the field of non-proliferation, the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the strengthening of the international cooperation on nuclear safety, radiological protection and waste management. The European Union wishes to make a few specific comments on these areas and on the general management of the IAEA.

Starting with non-proliferation, we should like first to recall the many achievements of the international community in this field during this period, which are a source of great satisfaction for the European Union.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has unquestionably been a decisive landmark on the path towards the attainment of a stable legal framework to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The decision on principles and objectives, also adopted by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT,

deserves special attention because it refers specifically to the IAEA, and in particular to the safeguards regime and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The principles recognize that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and ensuring compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The principles also state that the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased and that every effort should be made to ensure that the Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

Great progress has also been achieved on the path to greater universality of the NPT. The European Union welcomes the accession of Ukraine to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, as well as the accessions of 12 other States. Nevertheless, a small number of States continue to remain outside the fundamental norms that govern nuclear non-proliferation. I therefore appeal once again, on behalf of the European Union, to all these States — in particular those that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities — to accede to the Treaty.

Although considerable progress has been made in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, important challenges must still be faced in the near future, such as the conclusion no later than 1996 of an internationally and effectively verifiable zero-yield comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices — the so-called cut-off treaty — is another European Union priority in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. We also support the creation of new, internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, in accordance with the aforementioned principles and objectives approved by the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

As regards the IAEA safeguards, the European Union considers that strengthening the system by means of measures derived from the "93+2" Programme is a key priority. The Union expresses its satisfaction with the progress achieved in this field, in particular with the fact that the Board of Governors, at its meeting last June, urged States parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements to cooperate in the implementation of measures that constitute the first phase of the Programme. The European Union

hopes for the timely implementation of these measures and will cooperate to that end.

As to the group of measures that constitute the second phase of the Programme, their broad outlines were endorsed last March by the Board of Governors. The European Union is prepared to engage in further consultations with the secretariat of the IAEA on the measures to be taken in this phase, and is looking forward to cooperating in carrying out such consultations. The European Union hopes that, as a result of this process of consultation, concrete proposals on measures for States with comprehensive safeguards agreements will be presented to the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

Regarding the implementation of safeguards in 1994, the European Union supports the conclusions reached by the Director General of the IAEA. Concerning Iraq, the European Union notes with satisfaction the results attained in dismantling its clandestine nuclear programme as well as in implementing the permanent Plan for control and verification of compliance with resolutions of the Security Council. Nevertheless, long-term success can be ensured only if Iraq continues to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

The European Union welcomes the advances made in the implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, the European Union regrets that the DPRK still does not consider itself fully bound by its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and is not complying with its legal obligations under that agreement. This remains a matter of grave concern. In this respect, we welcome the resolution adopted by the last General Conference of the IAEA.

The potential for illicit trafficking in nuclear materials continues to give cause for general concern. The Union has actively participated in defining an international strategy to tackle this problem, within the IAEA framework. The existence of effective national accountancy and control systems, especially in those countries possessing sensitive nuclear material, and the existence of systems to ensure physical protection are crucial elements in fighting illicit trafficking.

Turning now to the activities of the Agency in the field of nuclear safety and radiological protection, the European Union would like first to express its satisfaction at the adoption and signature in 1994 of the Convention

on Nuclear Safety, and its hope that the Convention will soon enter into force.

The European Union also welcomes the progress achieved in the safe management of radioactive waste, which has paved the way for the drafting of a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

Among the many important activities carried out by the IAEA in the area of nuclear safety and radiological protection, one is of special interest to the European Union: the extrabudgetary programme for the safety of WWER and RMBK type reactors, to which the European Union makes a large financial contribution. The European Union provides firm support also for ensuring greater safety for these reactors, as is proved by its many contributions both bilaterally and through the PHARE and TACIS Programmes.

The broad range of contributions which the European Union makes every year to the IAEA technical cooperation programme is visible proof of the great importance it attaches to this matter.

A review of the information on the technical-cooperation activities for 1994 makes clear the magnitude of the work undertaken by the Secretariat of the Agency, which deserves praise, especially if one bears in mind the fact that it has had to develop its activities in the context of limited resources. Even so, this has not prevented a large increase in the technical assistance provided, as expressed in new net obligations. On the other hand, in the current resource situation it is even more important for the IAEA to continue to focus on ensuring that available resources are used effectively.

Looking now to future activities of the Agency, the European Union is of the opinion that a greater effort is needed to set priorities and to introduce stringent evaluation methods into all such activities. This will entail difficult decisions in order to ensure that all ineffective or low-priority programmes are eliminated, which will facilitate the financing of new programmes that are really necessary.

Looking further ahead, the time has come for the Agency to carry out the preparatory work needed to determine the directions and magnitude of its activities beyond the year 2000. The major new factors in this exercise will be the need to fully implement Programme "93+2", as well as the new responsibilities that could be assigned to the Agency in relation to future international treaties, such as the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty

and the so-called cut-off convention, on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

The European Union supports the draft resolution contained in document A/50/L.11, just introduced by the representative of the Netherlands, and hopes that the General Assembly will also support it.

Mr. Maruyama (Japan): I should like to thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his comprehensive and clear report to the Assembly.

This has been a special year in view of the decision that was taken at the Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), here in New York last May to extend the NPT indefinitely. At the time, two documents were also adopted — namely, "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" and "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". Further, it was reconfirmed that the IAEA has a very important role to play in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements.

Before I proceed to specific topics concerning the activities of the IAEA during the past year, I would like to take this opportunity to briefly take up the issue of nuclear testing.

The NPT Conference set 1996 as a target date for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and stated in its decision that

"Pending entry into force of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the nuclear-weapon-States should exercise utmost restraint." (*NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Decision 2, para. 4 (a)*)

Under these circumstances, the General Conference of the IAEA adopted without a vote a resolution which, *inter alia*, expressed grave concern at the resumption and the continuation of nuclear testing. My delegation believes that this resolution was a significant step in the process of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this connection, I would like to note the suggestion that Vienna be made the seat of the organization for that treaty, inasmuch as the necessary expertise could be made available by the IAEA in Vienna to support the organization. My delegation thinks that the location of the treaty organization is a very important issue, and should

be carefully considered during the negotiations on the treaty.

With regard to the suspected development of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan would like to reiterate that it welcomes the Agreed Framework, concluded in October 1994, between the United States and North Korea. Japan will continue to exert its utmost efforts to resolve this issue through its participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which was established in March of this year. My Government has always supported the Director General and his staff in their ongoing and impartial efforts to implement the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including efforts to monitor the freeze of specified facilities as requested by the Security Council.

The experiences of the IAEA in Iraq, as well as in North Korea, illustrate clearly the need to further strengthen the safeguards system. It is particularly important that the Agency improve its ability to detect undeclared nuclear development activities. The Agency has responded actively to this requirement. Japan supports the direction of Programme "93+2", which seeks to formulate measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system.

The adoption last year of the Convention on Nuclear Safety was truly an epochal development. Japan deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Convention in May of this year, and hopes that many other States will likewise do so, in order that the Convention may enter into force without delay.

The safe management of radioactive waste is also important in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan will make positive contributions to the Agency's activities in this area, including its deliberations on a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

I wish to note in this regard that the Agency has been actively involved in the improvement of nuclear safety and the establishment of safeguards systems in countries of the former Soviet Union. Recognizing the importance of these activities of the Agency, Japan has contributed to them and believes they should be continued.

Japan also attaches great importance to the multilateral technical cooperation activities of the Agency and has actively contributed both human and financial resources to support them. Japan will continue to provide assistance to

the best of its ability for the development and improvement of human resource skills in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that the Agency's achievements depend ultimately upon the firm support of member States. We must all do our best to further develop this important organization.

Ms. Tomová (Slovakia): At the outset I should like to say that we fully associate ourselves with the statement made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the European Union and associated countries.

The Slovak Republic deems the International Atomic Energy Agency to be a highly important international organization in the United Nations system. The IAEA plays an exceptionally significant role in verifying fulfilment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its safeguards system, as well as in the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Slovakia considers that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence within which those uses can take place. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty promotes stability, confidence and favourable conditions for the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament.

Slovakia has noted with satisfaction that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed the IAEA safeguards system as a key element of the Treaty for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA plays an irreplaceable role in the observance of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty through the safeguards system, with the aim of preventing the conversion of fissile material from peaceful uses to military purposes and of strengthening mutual confidence. During the recent period the safeguards system has justified itself. The IAEA safeguards provide an assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assist them to demonstrate this compliance. Such safeguards play a significant role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.

Slovakia strictly fulfils its obligations under its full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As far as

accounting is concerned, the owners of nuclear materials are obliged to keep exact records of the amounts, imports, exports, storage sites, consumption and transport in terms of the requirements of the IAEA and the Slovak Republic's Nuclear Regulatory Authority.

We have supported the IAEA's Programme "93+2" on strengthening and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. The Programme represents the utilization of modern, advanced verification techniques for better confidence-building in future. With the aim of implementing a more effective safeguards system, Slovakia supports the application of greater nuclear transparency, environmental monitoring, the expanded right to prompt access to information and sites, and short notice or notice inspections. We call for closer cooperation with the Agency. The case of Iraq is not the only case to highlight the need for the Agency to strengthen safeguards. With expanding nuclear disarmament and arms-control measures, all countries will demand highly credible verification in the nuclear field to provide assurances that declarations on nuclear material and installations are correct and complete and that nothing has been forgotten or hidden. Regarding the violation of commitments by Iraq, we strongly urge the Iraqi authorities to cooperate fully in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the activities of the Agency's Action Team. We also appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate fully with the Agency in its monitoring and safeguarding role.

Slovakia considers that measures to strengthen the safeguards system, effective and transparent multilateral export control, and activities aimed at preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials should be interconnected. We welcome the IAEA's efforts to help member States to meet their responsibilities in regard to the control of nuclear material. The IAEA safeguards should be an essential element of the verification of a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices. We regret that progress on a cut-off agreement appears to be slow.

An inseparable part of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issue is the comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). The CTBT should put in place a cost-effective and efficient international monitoring system that would have the capability of identifying and measuring effects related to nuclear explosions in three environments through several networks based on different technologies. With the aim of achieving the above-mentioned goals, we endorse close cooperation between the CTBT-implementing

organization and the IAEA and its co-location in Vienna. The Slovak Republic supports the early drafting, conclusion and entry into force of a CTBT banning all nuclear explosions once and for all, without any exception. We are pleased that negotiations on the treaty are making progress.

Slovakia welcomes the Agency's efforts to strengthen technical cooperation activities in areas such as nuclear safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, food production and the development of groundwater resources. The establishment of the Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Co-operation (SAGTAC) reflects a common desire to strengthen technical cooperation activities. We consider the concept of model projects to be a key element of the new approach. Model projects are the way to ensure that programmes meet the needs of end-users and conform to the priorities of the recipient country. This new approach is significantly increasing the Agency's contribution to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. In order to achieve social and economic objectives, recipient countries should also use a wider end-user approach to formulate project proposals. The elaboration of a medium-term country plan and a country programme framework will contribute to more effective technical assistance. We believe that the Agency will be provided with sufficient resources to implement its technical cooperation activities. We urge member States to show their deep commitment to the technical cooperation programme by pledging their full share of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund target.

The Slovak Republic takes a positive view of its cooperation with the IAEA in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It appreciates the contribution of several projects which are organized in collaboration with the IAEA for the further development of Slovakia's nuclear programme and for improvement of the nuclear safety and availability of our nuclear power plants. We welcome the significant increase in the Agency's technical cooperation with Slovakia over the past two years. A model project to strengthen the nuclear safety regulatory body in Slovakia is proceeding very satisfactorily. We are prepared to contribute to regional cooperation and to share our experience through similar projects in other countries.

Cooperation with the IAEA, of which Slovakia is a member of the Board of Governors, plays an important role in international contacts for the Slovak Republic. Technical assistance and cooperation, in particular, have developed very successfully. There are at present 6

national and 11 regional projects under implementation in which Slovakia is taking an active part. It is also successfully developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with G-24 countries, as well as with other countries.

As to preparatory work for a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, good progress has been made, and a final draft could be ready within a shorter period than originally anticipated. This is a necessary step to ensure that all countries manage their waste in such a way that the health of the public is assured, and that the nuclear energy option remains sustainable. The convention should be based on internationally accepted standards, international cooperation and exchange of information.

At the beginning of this year, the Slovak Republic ratified the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol on liability for nuclear damages. Liability for nuclear damage is a very sensitive issue for all countries, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe, owing to its close interrelation with technical assistance and supplies from Western companies. We hope that solutions will be found so that the drafting work on the revision of the Vienna Convention can soon be finalized. A broadly supported text is a prerequisite for a successful diplomatic conference and the conclusion of a convention which can attract broad adherence.

It should be underlined that Slovakia — as the first country to have nuclear power reactors on its territory — ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety at the beginning of this year. We urge other nations to do the same.

In the field of bilateral cooperation, the Slovak Republic has entered into a number of intergovernmental agreements covering the exchange of information and the supply of technology and nuclear materials and equipment for scientific, research and energy generation purposes. The implementation of these agreements complies strictly with the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with those concluded between the Slovak Republic and the IAEA, as well as those of a number of other international obligations and recommendations.

On the national level, a Nuclear Act is being prepared under the direction of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic. This Act will declare the safe uses of nuclear energy, for peaceful purposes only, in conformity with international treaties.

In the Slovak Republic, nuclear energy is being used exclusively for peaceful, predominantly energy-generating, purposes. The country has low national fuel and general energy resources. Nuclear energy plays an inevitable role in the national economy. The Slovak Republic has a long tradition in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 1994 it rated fifth in the world, with a nearly 50 per cent share of electricity generated at nuclear power plants. The long-term plan for the energy sector has also recognized that the role of nuclear energy is irreplaceable. It proposes that two WWER-440 type reactor units be put into operation at the Mochovce site by the year 2000, with another two reactor units at the same site to be put into operation later. In addition to the energy sector, nuclear energy is also being applied in health care, scientific research and industry.

We deeply appreciate the cooperation of the IAEA and advanced countries providing technical support, engineering services and nuclear components to Slovakia — especially in nuclear safety matters. All nuclear projects in the Slovak Republic, including the safety upgrading of older reactor units built according to earlier safety standards and the construction of new reactor units, have a significant international character.

Mr. Vajpayee (India): We have heard the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presented so ably by its Director General Mr. Hans Blix, with keen interest, and noted its contents.

As one of the founder members of the Agency, India has consistently attached the highest importance to the IAEA's objectives. India had the honour and privilege of being the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Agency in 1994-1995. We participate actively in the manifold functions of the Agency — be they promotional, safety-related or regulatory.

The statute of the Agency spells out in unambiguous terms the primary function of the Agency:

"To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world."

While welcoming the measures and decisions taken by the Agency to strengthen its promotional activities, we call on States to pledge their respective shares of the Assistance and Technical Cooperation Fund and to make timely payments to the Fund. We are, however, dismayed to see the great resistance shown by some

countries to backing these consensus decisions with adequate financial support. India has been a staunch supporter of the Agency's technical cooperation activities. In the last year or so, the Agency has taken important steps in strengthening these activities through, *inter alia*, the Policy Review Seminar and development of model projects. We also welcome resolutions on the Agency's role in extensive use of isotope hydrology for water resources management and the regional projects associated with desalination for producing potable water economically.

These, along with resolutions such as that adopted in 1993 on food irradiation, are important practical examples of non-power applications of nuclear energy for the benefit of humankind. We believe the Agency can and must do much more in these areas, as well as addressing the issues of the underutilization of existing facilities in some of the developing countries, while assisting in alleviating the financial problems that are hampering progress on other projects.

The non-power applications of atomic energy in the fields of agriculture, medicine and industry have grown significantly. We hope that the Agency will develop more projects that have a direct bearing on improving the quality of life of people in developing countries and that such model projects will provide an impetus to the growth of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. For its part, India will be ready to enhance its interaction with the Agency in these areas and to share its know-how, either through the technical cooperation programmes of the Agency or on a bilateral basis.

One of the Agency's most important activities, in line with its mandate, should be to assist member States in developing nuclear-power technologies and in facilitating the exchange of technical know-how and information in this field. The profile of this activity should be influenced solely by technical considerations. Basically, the Agency should be an advanced technical body dealing with multidisciplinary areas of science and technology, and should play a proactive and catalytic role in the field of atomic energy. It should be a storehouse and a dissemination centre for technical information in these areas. This kind of role of the Agency, *vis-à-vis* operational experience with existing reactors and design information on advanced reactor systems, will help in advancing the cause of nuclear safety. Such a role will benefit not only the developing countries but also the developed countries. We believe it is high time that the Agency cooperated with developing countries in facing the issues involved in actually setting up nuclear-power plants,

rather than limiting its activities to comparative studies and developing databases. We also believe that technology-control regimes must not prove to be a barrier to the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Considerable time and effort have been devoted to the strengthening of safeguards under comprehensive safeguards agreements. This is in line with another objective of the Agency, which is to

"ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it (...) is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose" (*Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, article II*).

Experience has shown that this has been done very successfully by the Agency. However, the Agency has also been given in its statute a function

"to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State" (*ibid.*, *article III, para. 5*).

Over the years this function seems to have overtaken the former objective. Applying safeguards is an important function and needs to be performed well, in the tradition of the Agency.

India recognizes the purpose of the exercise under way on the strengthening of safeguards and improving their efficiency and cost-effectiveness under the programme called "93+2", but advocates keeping a balanced approach. Overreacting to any situation or calling for measures with doubtful technical value, measures leading to results that may be interpreted subjectively, and so on, may do more harm than good.

Safeguards measures should be cost-effective, legally valid, equitable and politically acceptable and must respect the sovereignty of member States. Applying excessive pressure could only lead to a breakdown of the system, as has been recently observed. Distorting the perspective by excessive use of clichés such as transparency and voluntary submission may lead to a situation where the Agency finds it difficult to give a comprehensive clean chit to a member State, even — as has also been observed — after making intrusive demands. Anything that compromises the credibility of the Agency as a neutral, objective body must be meticulously avoided.

Similarly, on the issue of the implementation of the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we feel that this is a complex and substantive issue on which there have been many developments, both technical and political. Our viewpoint has been consistent in that we believe that the best way to resolve this difficult issue is through patient discussion among all the parties concerned. We support a policy of cooperation and dialogue rather than one of confrontation and imposition of deadlines, and in this spirit we welcome the movement forward in the discussions between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). For this reason in the General Conference we abstained on the resolution, which we felt was not contributing to a positive result.

The threat posed by illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is grave, particularly when it is linked to clandestine nuclear programmes. We have noted the efforts of the Agency to help improve national systems of accounting and control, as well as its intention to develop a reliable database of incidents of illicit trafficking. While prevention of illicit trafficking is entirely a national responsibility, the Agency can help by conducting training programmes.

The recent nuclear tests carried out by some States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) soon after its indefinite extension highlight the inherent defects of the Treaty. These developments will also have repercussions on the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We see that treaty as a step towards nuclear disarmament, but it will be meaningful only if it is linked firmly to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a stipulated time framework. Our position on the NPT is well known. We have always unequivocally supported all efforts at non-proliferation that are universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory. A sincere attempt to reach this goal is conspicuous now by its absence.

India has always supported the activities of the Agency, which has evolved useful mechanisms for increasing the interaction of member States. In addition to the training programmes, the mechanisms of coordinated research and research contracts programmes are particularly useful. Recently, India also provided some nuclear instrumentation and related software to the IAEA Laboratory at Seibersdorf. These included iodine, air particulate and Argon-41 monitors, which together form an Environmental Activity Release Monitoring System. This will be used by the Seibersdorf Laboratories for the training of scientists and technicians. We are capable of

commercially supplying a variety of nuclear instruments to meet the demands of the IAEA member States.

Before concluding, I should once again like to reiterate that we extend our full support for and cooperation with the IAEA in its efforts towards promoting and enhancing the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of the health, peace and prosperity of people throughout the world.

Mr. Inderfurth (United States of America): On behalf of the United States, my delegation wishes to express its strong support for cosponsorship of the draft resolution before the General Assembly today on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its annual report for 1994. As the Assembly knows, the IAEA is entrusted with the dual responsibility of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of guarding against its use for any military purpose. Through safeguards, the IAEA performs an important global security function and, as such, is an institution of critical importance to the United States and the international community. We commend Director General Blix and the IAEA secretariat for their continued, effective and committed service.

The IAEA's extensive, effective and unique system of safeguards provides a foundation of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The safeguards system builds confidence among States that transfers of nuclear technology and information will not be diverted to military purposes and thereby undermine international peace and security.

My Government supports the actions taken by the IAEA and the Board of Governors for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards programme. In particular, we support efforts to increase access to information and locations in order to improve the Agency's ability to detect diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities and to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared facilities.

With respect to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States has always considered it to be the benchmark of the international non-proliferation regime. We believe its indefinite extension this past May confirmed the international community's commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to enhancing global security and stability.

On the subject of Iraq, recent revelations from Iraq regarding its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, confirm the extent to which that country is willing to go to deceive the international community and fail to honour its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. The United States commends the continuing efforts of the IAEA to determine the scope of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons programme; undertaken in clear violation of Iraq's commitments as a party to the NPT. We support the IAEA's work in putting in place a long-term monitoring mechanism in Iraq, which is essential to continuing efforts to thwart future Iraqi acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. I use this opportunity to call again upon Iraq to honour fully and honestly the commitments it accepted under Security Council resolution 687 (1971), and others, and to provide immediately all information and equipment relating to its weapons of mass destruction programmes to the IAEA and to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

In pursuit of peace on the troubled Korean Peninsula, my Government worked hard to achieve the October 1994 Agreed Framework with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Under that agreement, both sides accepted obligations to defuse tensions on the Peninsula and to create a viable nuclear-energy programme in the DPRK. Progress under the Agreed Framework is continuing. However, none of the work currently under way would be possible without the unique role performed by the IAEA in monitoring the freeze of the DPRK's existing nuclear programme as envisaged in the Agreed Framework. There is a long way to go to achieve full implementation of this remarkable agreement. However, each step forward will strengthen the prospect for truly lasting peace in the region. The IAEA should take great satisfaction from its involvement in this important effort.

The IAEA should also take great satisfaction from serving as a catalyst for the successful conclusion of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was opened for signature in September 1994. The safety Convention represents an effort by the international community to ensure that the use of nuclear energy is safe, well regulated and environmentally sound. Its main precept, however, is that the safe use of nuclear as well as other forms of energy remains essentially the national responsibility of the respective States. Through the Convention, States will bind themselves to a number of important safety guidelines and accept to participate in and report to periodic peer-review meetings to verify implementation of the Convention's obligations. The United

States was an original signatory of this instrument. We encourage other States to sign on and ratify the Convention.

On the subject of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we commend the IAEA secretariat for its efforts to improve delivery of technical cooperation with the creation of the model-project concept. We believe the effort to improve project formulation, management and implementation can only lead to a more efficient programme. The United States will remain engaged in this effort. After all, it is the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the areas of medicine, agriculture and industry which demonstrate its concrete, tangible benefits to mankind.

In closing, my Government wishes to commend the IAEA for its invaluable contribution to international peace, security and welfare. The United States pledges its continuing strong support for the important work of the IAEA.

Mr. Sha Zukang (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has listened attentively to the statement by Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and takes note of the report of the Agency. I wish to express, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, our appreciation for the Agency's efforts last year in promoting international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in nuclear non-proliferation.

Over the past year progress has been made in the field of international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in nuclear non-proliferation. Last May, in this very Hall, the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) decided without a vote to extend the NPT indefinitely and adopted the "Principles and Objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the "Strengthening of the Review Mechanism of the [NPT]". These results of the NPT Review Conference are useful for the enhancement of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the maintenance of international peace and security and would help to enhance the role of the IAEA in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and therefore would conform to the interests of all States parties.

Promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as international cooperation in this field, is one of the main objectives set forth in the statute of the IAEA. The

Chinese delegation is pleased to note that the Agency has in recent years undertaken some tentative reform measures in the field of technical cooperation and assistance. The model projects proposed and initially implemented by the Agency's secretariat have taken into full account the economic-development priorities and specific requirements of the recipient countries. These projects, therefore, have received the support of the recipient Governments and are showing good prospects for socio-economic benefits. China attaches importance to these projects. In 1994, the Chinese Government pledged a donation of \$1 million to the Agency, mainly to finance two model Agency projects in Africa. To help promote these projects, this year the Chinese Government has again pledged to the Agency \$200,000.

The prevention of nuclear proliferation has a bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security. It is an important issue of wide concern to the IAEA member States as to how the Agency should proceed from its statute and relevant international agreements and fulfil its safeguards functions in a fairer and more effective manner. China attaches importance to the safeguards of the Agency, appreciates the efforts of the Agency's secretariat in its implementation of Programme "93+2", and has taken note of a whole set of measures proposed by the secretariat to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards regime. China believes that the improved safeguards system should be fair, objective, rational, transparent and feasible, and implemented strictly in accordance with the statute and relevant international agreements, on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of countries concerned, without jeopardizing their legitimate rights.

China holds that the strengthening of the safeguards regime must avoid any adverse effect on the development of nuclear science, technology and industry in various countries, or on international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Any discrimination or abuse of safeguards information and verification must be avoided.

China holds that the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should not be interpreted as allowing the perpetual possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon countries. China consistently stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and works for the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. As a State party to the NPT and a member of the IAEA, China has fulfilled in good faith its obligations in the field of international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the prevention of the proliferation of

nuclear weapons, and the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. At a time when we are appraising the efforts of the United Nations in the past 50 years in promoting international peace and development, we expect the IAEA, an important specialized agency of the United Nations, to play an increased role in promoting international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. China will, as always, work with all other member countries of the IAEA for the achievement of the objectives set out in the statute.

Mr. Kovanda (Czech Republic): My delegation has associated itself with the statement of the European Union presented by the delegation of Spain earlier in the meeting, and I will therefore limit myself to a few additions and points of emphasis. The Czech Republic views the IAEA as one of the most important bodies within the United Nations system, and welcomed its annual General Conference held in Vienna from 18 to 22 September 1995. During its thirty-ninth session, the General Conference concentrated on evaluating the IAEA's activities in the previous period, and we consider the previous year a successful one.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the thorough evaluation of all aspects of implementing it were the most important events of the year. We recall the difficulties we faced on the way to this objective. But member States have now explicitly committed themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and very clearly reiterated their "no" to any threat of world destruction by nuclear weapons. These accomplishments fully coincide with the foreign policy objectives of the Czech Republic.

No discussion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy can avoid issues of nuclear safety: that is, the safe operation of nuclear facilities, safe management of nuclear waste, protection against radiation, and liability for nuclear damage. Signing the Convention on Nuclear Safety, during the thirty-eighth session of the IAEA General Conference, was an important step in allaying these concerns. The Czech Republic was among the first 20 signatories of the Convention, and our Parliament ratified it on 23 May 1995. My country encourages all member States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention, so that it may enter into force as

soon as possible. This too is what GC(39)/RES/13 of the General Conference invited them to do.

The issue of the safe manipulation of nuclear waste is one of our main priorities. Preparing the draft of the relevant convention and convening an expert session in Vienna in June 1995 were steps in the right direction. We do not assume that working out the final draft of the new convention will be problem-free. Nevertheless, our common objective — global protection of the population against the irresponsible manipulation of nuclear waste — should help us to find generally acceptable language.

Of course, acceptance of a convention does not automatically assure its objectives. An operational multilateral verification mechanism which will dispel concerns about breaches of its provisions is essential for achieving the objective in question. My delegation respects the IAEA's role in providing safeguards at nuclear facilities all over the world. We continue to support the Agency's effort to develop a strengthened safeguard system based on the so-called Programme "93+2", which integrates all proven items of the present system with certain additional measures. We welcome the adoption of GC(39)/RES/17, which requested the Director General of the IAEA to implement, at an early date, measures outlined in Part I of document GOV/2807 and as soon as possible, after consulting member States, to put before the Board of Governors clear proposals for measures suggested in Part 2.

As we appreciate the necessity to ensure sufficient financial means for inspections on the basis of collective responsibility, we welcome the agreement on a new system of financing safeguards as well as on voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, approved by the IAEA General Conference. The Czech Republic is committed to paying its pledges in full and on time.

Even though my country acceded only two years ago to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, we welcome attempts to amend the present text of this Convention so that it also covers areas not exhaustively covered currently. We believe that the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage should focus on revising the Vienna Convention, and are open to all ideas concerning more universal coverage. We consider the supplementary funding issue a very important component of these discussions.

Illicit trafficking in nuclear material is a most serious matter. We fully support the steps the Agency has taken in order to stop it. In view of our geographical location, we particularly appreciate close regional cooperation in this matter.

The Czech Republic supports the IAEA's effort to monitor the freeze of the nuclear programme in specified facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, according to the mandate the IAEA has from the United Nations Security Council. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should meet its obligations and fully implement the full scope of safeguards within its territory. We also appeal to its authorities to provide the Agency with all necessary information to help complete the country's initial report on the inventory of its nuclear material subject to safeguards.

In the light of the detection of further details of the Iraqi nuclear-weapon development programme in August 1995, we also fully support the Agency's right to continue to monitor every aspect of Iraq's ability to develop nuclear weaponry. In GC(39)/RES/5, the General Conference appealed to Iraq to cooperate consistently with the Agency, particularly with regard to the ongoing monitoring and verification plan.

I wish to express my delegation's appreciation and support for the work of Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, and of the Agency's secretariat, which performs excellently even under difficult financial circumstances. And in conclusion, my delegation recommends the adoption of the draft resolution concerning the IAEA, of which we are a sponsor exactly as submitted.

Mr. Hudyma (Ukraine) (*interpretation from Russian*): The delegation of Ukraine would like to thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his comprehensive and well-balanced report on the work of the Agency last year. It is clear from the report that the Agency has continued the successful performance of its activities in promoting worldwide cooperation in the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy.

I also welcome the fact that the IAEA is seen as one of the most effective Agencies of the United Nations. There is no doubt that this organ plays an important role in ensuring the non-use of nuclear energy for military purposes, rendering assistance to Member States, enhancing the safety of nuclear activities within States and disseminating nuclear technology for applications in

various fields. I am convinced that the IAEA, as an organ of the United Nations system specializing in the nuclear field, will continue to promote peace and security throughout the world.

This year was marked by a truly historic event in the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation: the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), whose fundamental importance in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been proved over the 25 years of its existence. Ukraine acceded to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and is doing all it can to do away with the nuclear potential it inherited from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). I should like to express the conviction that this well-thought-out and deliberate decision by my Government, along with its consistent support of the need to make the Treaty permanent, helped promote the success of the Conference of the Parties to the NPT, which was held in this very Hall.

We also welcome the progress made in other important areas of arms control and disarmament and wish to express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will complete negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1996 and that it will make significant progress in its work on a convention to ban the production of fissile materials for military purposes. We take a favourable view of the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, as well as the willingness expressed by the United States, the United Kingdom and France to accede, after Russia and China, to the Protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga. My Government is convinced that these steps will promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world as well.

The IAEA safeguards play an important role in the implementation of the NPT. Thanks to the effective operation of the safeguards system and the consolidation of cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Agency is contributing significantly to strengthening general safety and ensuring general development. In the future the IAEA should resolve matters related to the more complex tasks in the ongoing process of nuclear disarmament, which will remain an immutable reality.

In its desire to promote fully the consolidation of the safeguards system, Ukraine stated its readiness, at the thirty-ninth session of the IAEA, to sign the agreement relevant to its accession to the NPT. I should also like to note that the current agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA on the application of safeguards to all nuclear

materials and all peaceful nuclear activities in Ukraine, despite the country's extremely problematic economic situation, is being successfully implemented as of last January. With the Agency's direct and active support and assistance, significant work has been done to implement the provisions of this agreement, including the establishment of a Government system for the accounting and monitoring of nuclear materials, inspections, training of personnel and the preparation of the necessary technical facilities. Ukraine attaches great importance to the linkages in the Agency's fundamental activities between safeguards, safety and technology transfer. Ensuring the safety of nuclear technology, nuclear-waste management and cooperation in the various applications of nuclear technology all depend on the assurance that nuclear energy and technology are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Ukraine was among the first signatories of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We believe that high standards of protection and of nuclear-waste management are extremely important if the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is to be continued. At the end of 1995 the Ukraine's Supreme Council passed a law on the use of nuclear energy and radiological protection, which was drafted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Work is now under way to align domestic legislation and safety regulations with the requirements of this new law. We hope to complete this process in the very near future so that the Convention on Nuclear Safety can be submitted for ratification as soon as possible.

The delegation of Ukraine welcomes the significant progress made in the establishment of standards for nuclear-waste management and in the drafting of a relevant convention. Ukraine participates in the group of experts established for that purpose and hopes that the active approach of all States will make it possible to reach a long-term consensus solution to the problem of nuclear-waste management. In this connection, we wish to note that Ukraine has adopted a law on regulating nuclear-waste management, which is a very important sphere of activity.

Another important problem for the international system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. We believe that, even though States themselves are responsible for an adequate and effective level of physical protection against nuclear materials, the IAEA and other international organizations can play an important role in ensuring international

cooperation, including by providing technical assistance to countries in fields other than law-enforcement. We consider it important for the IAEA to take the measures needed to improve the Agency's existing database on illicit traffic in nuclear materials, and we believe this database should include information on other sources of radioactivity. We call upon all States to take national measures that would promote the operation of such a system.

In conclusion, I would like to touch upon yet another problem of exceptional importance to my country: the question of the future of the Chernobyl plant and of energy in Ukraine as a whole. Nuclear energy continues to play a significant role in our country's economy. Nuclear power plants produce over a third of all the electrical power generated in Ukraine, and the proportion of atomic energy in our country's energy supply continues to rise. As for shutting down Chernobyl, we are pleased to note that this question is receiving the international community's attention. We welcome the Agency's initiative to convene in the spring of 1996 an international conference in connection with the tenth anniversary of the accident in Chernobyl's block IV. At the same time, the negotiating process on the proposals adopted by the Big Seven in Naples in 1994 regarding ways and means to shut down Chernobyl has not yet been completed. The President of Ukraine has stated his plans to shut down Chernobyl before the year 2000, on condition that large-scale assistance rendered to Ukraine in the fields of energy and nuclear safety as a whole be fully in line with the realities existing in Ukraine today.

At the end of the summer, in his letter to the Heads of State of the Big Seven, the President of Ukraine confirmed Ukraine's position on this issue. However, he pointed out again that the West's delay in providing the promised assistance would force Ukraine to act on the basis — first and foremost of national priorities as well as our country's economic and technical capacities.

For Ukraine, which is carrying out economic reforms under complex financial-economic conditions, assistance from other States in resolving the problems of Chernobyl will have a decisive impact.

In addition, we cannot speak of shutting down the Chernobyl plant without an understanding of problems connected with ensuring safety in the plant and in the Ukritiye facility and rehabilitating the contaminated area as a whole. I should like to point out that to date all the work related to the safe operation of the Chernobyl plant and the rehabilitation of the contaminated Ukritiye territory is being

carried out by Ukraine independently, without any support from the international community and that Ukraine is spending annually over \$100 million to this end.

Ukraine considers that one of the possible ways to obtain an objective analysis of and to solve the problems connected with the Chernobyl accident would be to set up an international technological research centre which would deal with issues related to the elimination of the consequences of nuclear radiological accidents and in whose work leading experts from various countries in the world could participate. We call upon all countries to cooperate in the establishment of such a centre.

In conclusion, I should like to assure the General Assembly that Ukraine will continue to play a constructive role in resolving the important tasks connected with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr. Raichev (Bulgaria): At the outset I should like to express my delegation's strong support for the views contained in the statement of the representative of Spain made on behalf of the European Union and the States associated with it. Bulgaria, as one of those States, shares the attitudes set forth in the statement.

My delegation commends the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under the able leadership of Mr. Hans Blix, for its continuing success in adapting to a series of new and demanding challenges over the past year. The report that the Director General introduced on the activities of the Agency in 1994 demonstrates that its tasks have been undertaken in a way that inspires confidence and appreciation from the member States. For this reason, my delegation is a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/50/L.11, on the Agency's annual report.

The thirty-ninth session of the General Conference of the IAEA met in a year that was a landmark for nuclear non-proliferation. On 11 May the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons took the historic decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, to strengthen the review process and to adopt a set of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We welcome this outcome, which is in the best security interests of all.

The Review and Extension Conference recognized the outstanding role of the IAEA in implementing the basic provisions of the Treaty. The outcome of the

Conference has far-reaching implications for the work of the Agency, particularly as regards the safeguards system, which underpins a major part of the non-proliferation regime and international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The IAEA was expressly recognized as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with safeguards agreements. We support the Agency's ongoing activities aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards regime. The development of measures to enhance the IAEA system of safeguards is progressing well, and excellent results were achieved at the June meeting of the Board of Governors. We look forward to considering further detailed Agency proposals on part II measures of the Programme "93+2" later this year. There is no doubt that the IAEA full-scope safeguard agreements are of universal benefit and will remain the key element in encouraging international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The resolution adopted at last year's General Conference on the strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities has resulted in a number of initiatives which need to be commended. Compared with past years, the level of implementation of the Technical Cooperation Programme has been the highest. Of special interest also are the proposals for a country programme framework and the model-project approach, which broaden the principal objective of technical cooperation toward the achievement of social and economic goals. In our view, these activities should be further developed and expanded.

In 1994 Bulgaria continued to fulfil its obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. During the year, there has been no change in the number and operational status of our nuclear facilities, which total six operating nuclear power reactors, one repository for spent nuclear fuel, and one research reactor. The Agency carried out eight inspections on two technical visits to check up on the inventory and the accountancy for our nuclear material. The official statements of the IAEA on the findings of the inspections have shown that my country is strictly observing its commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Nuclear power and nuclear methods and techniques are widely used in various sectors of our national economy. Nuclear power plays a significant role in meeting the power needs of the country. For example, in 1994 only 45.6 per cent of power production was of nuclear origin. Very serious attention is being paid to ensure safety at the

Kozloduy nuclear power plant. Long-term measures are taken to ensure safety conditions; these could be best described as "sustainable safety". In all our efforts during the past several years aimed at enhancing nuclear safety, we have been supported by the IAEA. In cooperation with the Agency, national projects have been implemented, such as those of the improvement of national regulatory standards on nuclear and radiational safety, for the modernization of the equipment for tritium measurement in the radiochemical laboratory of Sofia University; and for the assessment of the safety at the sites of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant and the Belene nuclear power plant, in particular their seismic characteristics and the seismic rigidity of the buildings and facilities.

Bulgaria participated in the regional projects for Eastern Europe related to safety of the water-cooled and moderated type reactor (WWER) safety, spent fuel repositories, radioactive waste management and strengthening of regulatory bodies. Bulgaria participates in the international system of nuclear information and the system for incident reporting.

In conclusion, I should like to reaffirm our intention to cooperate fully with the Agency's member States and its secretariat with a view to attaining the goals we have set together for the future performance of the IAEA.

Mr. Al-Awot (Kuwait) (*interpretation from Arabic*): We discuss today one of the most important items on the General Assembly's agenda. The item's importance is much greater at this session in view of the nature of the new developments that have taken place with regard to the work and competence of the IAEA.

My delegation is fully aware of the important task undertaken by the Agency in the areas of nuclear power, nuclear technologies, nuclear safety, radiation protection and the management of radioactive wastes. We are aware also of the assistance extended by the International Atomic Energy Agency to developing countries in all these areas. As we commemorate at this session of the General Assembly the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, with special emphasis on the Organization's major objective of maintaining international peace and security, we must acknowledge that the Agency now performs one of the most important roles in striving after that objective. We must emphasize also that the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a real threat to security and stability at the international and regional levels.

The vital role of the International Atomic Energy Agency has acquired added importance through the world community's realization of the clear connection between disarmament and development. Huge military expenditures impede economic development and adversely affect the content and scope of international economic cooperation. Accordingly, the Agency's role in making sure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes, is vital for the promotion of international peace and security and, thereby, works in favour of one of the major objectives of our Organization.

The international community has witnessed two important developments in the two areas of proliferation or control of weapons of mass destruction. The most important development I can refer to today is the success achieved last April with the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). My country believes that this Treaty is the cornerstone of the international regime that prevents the proliferation of one of the most deadly of overkill weapons that cause concern for all countries of the world. We, therefore, call upon Israel once again to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in response to the fundamental requirement of peace in the region.

It is only right that I should refer to the second of those two developments in the area of controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in the wake of the grave and tremendous information that has been unearthed recently concerning Iraq's armaments programme. Had it not been for the grace of God, the efforts of the Special Commission that has been entrusted with the task of destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iraq would have been able to destabilize the whole of the Middle East region and of the world at large. The recent unearthing of the grave details of the armaments programmes that Iraq had kept secret is a serious development indeed, not in terms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons alone, but also as a breach and a violation of the safety measures that the International Atomic Energy Agency stresses very strongly indeed.

My delegation wishes to extend its thanks and appreciation to the Director General of the IAEA and to his staff, and to the Chairman of the Special Commission for the untiring efforts deployed in following up Iraq's implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). However, my country is keen that the pressure be maintained to force Iraq to implement

these resolutions in a manner that would put paid to the threats Iraq poses to the countries of the region, especially in view of that country's known preparation, following its invasion of Kuwait, of a crash programme that aimed at producing nuclear weapons in a short period of time, from the high-grade uranium it extracted from the nuclear fuels of its two reactors. This was scheduled to reach completion by April 1991. However, the Allies' aerial bombardment during the liberation of my country put a stop to that operation, thanks be to Allah.

This, without a doubt, exposes Iraq's lies in its official statements to the Security Council wherein it had insisted that it had halted all research and development operations relating to the production of nuclear weapons with the beginning of its invasion of my country. Mr. Hans Blix has assured the members of the Security Council recently that Iraq's attempt to use enriched uranium in September 1991 constituted a clear breach of the agreement signed by Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency. He has also stressed the fact that Iraq's concealment of the latest information over the past four years was in flagrant violation of its commitments under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The fears and anxieties caused by Iraq's armaments programme do not arise from its possession of nuclear weapons alone. Those fears and anxieties extend to other weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical and biological weapons. Iraq has made great strides in that direction too. What causes special concern to Kuwait, however, is that Iraq has not yet acceded to the NPT while all its actions and intentions show that it constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.

Kuwait is absolutely convinced that it is imperative to consolidate all efforts in trying to develop the human race and to safeguard its right to live in peace and security without the fears and anxieties caused by weapons for its extermination and without any threat to its stability or to its aspirations after a better world.

The human race deserves to be prepared for a world wherein advanced technology would be used to ensure the prosperity and development of humanity and not for the purpose of its destruction and effacement from the face of the earth. This can be achieved only through the deep conviction that international relations should be governed by the principles of peace, democracy, freedom, the equal sovereignty of States and the promotion of peaceful cooperation.

Mr. Al-Akwa (Yemen) (*interpretation from Arabic*): As representatives must be hungry by now, I promise that my statement will not be long.

I should like, at the outset, to express our deep thanks and appreciation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its assistance to the developing countries, including our country, the Republic of Yemen, to which the Agency has granted several fellowships and technical grants in the fields of health, agriculture and pharmacology. We commend also the IAEA Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, and his colleagues for their efforts in the preparation of the report on the Agency's activities in 1994.

There is no doubt that the activities undertaken and the responsibilities shouldered by the Agency are worthy of our appreciation and respect in view of their positive returns with regard to the safety and security of the whole world, on the one hand, and, on the other, their contribution to social and economic development and other activities by facilitating the transfer of nuclear technologies for peaceful use in the developing countries.

In the field of world peace and security, the Agency must be able to give sufficient guarantees, and it undertakes the full supervision of nuclear installations in various countries to ensure that nuclear energy is not used in a manner that would endanger international peace and security. In this connection, we call upon the countries concerned to enhance their cooperation with the Agency and to support in order for the International Atomic Energy Agency to be able to discharge the statutory functions mandated to it by its statute and enshrined in Treaties on the prevention of nuclear threats and damage.

In this context, we hope that the nuclear States will meet their commitments to the non-nuclear States in accordance with Article VI of the NPT following the Review and Extension Conference of April 1995.

We invoke international legality in calling on the international community to encourage the establishment of zones of peace wherever they may be needed throughout the world, and particularly in the Middle East region, which continues to be threatened by the proliferation of nuclear weapons because a certain country refuses to accede to the NPT and to place its facilities under the IAEA inspection and safeguards system.

Peace, in our conviction and the conviction of others, is an indivisible whole. The international community must

therefore take the necessary measures to ensure the universality and comprehensive nature of the NPT, without exception for any State of the region. Perhaps the most important measure in this regard is to begin to work for the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Returning to questions relating to the IAEA, we support the call for expanding the membership of the Agency's Board of Governors in order to reflect current economic and political developments and the democratic nature of the post-cold-war world. To this end, we should reconsider Article VI of the Agency's statute. In this regard, we support the initiative of the Kingdom of Morocco as contained in document GOV/2814/Rev.1.

Mr. Park (Republic of Korea): My delegation wishes to express its deep appreciation to Director General Hans Blix of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his excellent and informative report. We also commend Mr. Blix and, through him, the secretariat of the Agency for the devotion and professionalism with which they have carried out their responsibilities.

Safeguards and technical cooperation are the twin pillars of the IAEA's responsibilities. In both areas, the Agency is faced with daunting challenges. Now that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is indefinitely extended, the Agency's mandate to verify States Parties' undertakings under the Treaty has been put on a permanent footing. The challenge for the Agency in this connection is to keep providing credible assurances on States Parties' compliance with their non-proliferation commitments in an increasingly volatile international security environment and amidst a rapid quantitative increase in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and constant advances in nuclear technology.

The Agency's safeguards system, which is primarily aimed at verifying the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities, has revealed serious shortcomings in recent cases of non-compliance. Providing assurances with respect to the absence of undeclared activities of NPT States Parties has now become indispensable if the Agency is to fulfil its mandate under the Treaty. In this regard, my Government attaches great importance to the Agency's measures to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system under Programme "93+2". We welcome the IAEA Board of Governors' endorsement of

Part I of the Programme last June and look forward to the early adoption of Part II.

We attach particular importance to those measures designed to strengthen the Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including environmental monitoring and no-notice inspection. A more effective safeguards system is a necessary condition for verifying States parties' non-proliferation commitments, but it is not a sufficient condition to deter a determined State from developing nuclear weapons. Programme "93+2" can attain its intended purpose only when the States parties are willing to cooperate with the IAEA inspectorate in the implementation of the Programme.

The strengthened safeguards system is not only important from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation. It is all the more important for the contribution it can make to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by fostering an international climate of mutual confidence through greater worldwide nuclear transparency. The IAEA's technical cooperation programmes are designed precisely to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In fact, one of the tangible benefits developing countries expect from accession to the NPT is technical cooperation from the IAEA. Therefore, what many developing countries have expected of donor countries in the wake of the indefinite extension of the NPT is a gesture of political goodwill in funding the Agency's technical cooperation programmes. In this connection, my delegation wishes to express its concern at the declining interest of donor countries in technical cooperation financing. If the IAEA is going to fulfil its statutory responsibilities in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we believe that it is essential to put the financing of the Agency's technical cooperation activities on a secure and predictable footing.

For many developing countries, nuclear power is one of the most viable options for meeting the growing energy requirements of environmentally sustainable development. The Republic of Korea has 10 power reactors in operation and six units under construction, which supply roughly one-third of its electricity needs. As such, nuclear power has proved to be the most economical and clean source of energy, permitting sustained economic growth in my country. The Republic of Korea is willing to share with other countries the technical capabilities and experiences in the application of nuclear energy that it has accumulated over the years.

Central to the promotion of nuclear energy is nuclear safety. In this respect, we call upon those countries which have not done so to ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety without further delay. We welcome the adoption of Safety Fundamentals by the IAEA Board of Governors and look forward to the finalization of the convention on the safe management of radioactive waste at the earliest date.

My Government shares the view that the time has come to reform the IAEA Board of Governors through the amendment of Article VI of the Agency's statute. In our view, the current composition of the Board does not properly reflect the fundamental and structural changes that the international nuclear community has undergone since the last reform of the Board more than 20 years ago.

We strongly believe that the Board should be restructured in such a way as to accommodate the dynamic features of underlying international realities. A timely reform is indispensable not only for the organizational vitality of the Agency, but also for maintaining the representativeness of the Board and the relevance of its decisions. We also call for transparency in the practice of designating Board members. The designation process should be guided by objective criteria and conducted in compliance with the relevant provisions of the IAEA statute.

Turning now to the North Korean nuclear issue, we note that the long-standing international efforts to resolve the issue have entered a new phase with the signing of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework on 21 October 1994 in Geneva. We welcomed the Agreed Framework as a positive step toward the ultimate resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.

There has been some progress in the implementation of the Agreed Framework, including uninterrupted monitoring by the IAEA inspectors of the freeze of specified nuclear facilities in North Korea, as requested by the Security Council. Discussions are currently under way between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and North Korea on the provision of light water reactors in the context of implementation of the Agreed Framework.

It must be recalled, however, that a bilateral agreement cannot replace, supersede or detract from multilateral obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement, which remains binding and in force. The

Agreed Framework is a complementary instrument to bring North Korea into full compliance with its multilateral legal obligations under the NPT and the safeguards agreement. Despite modest progress from the standpoint of the Agreed Framework, there is no change in the situation of North Korea's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. While expressing our concern over North Korea's continuing non-compliance, we urge North Korea to come promptly into full compliance and to take all steps the IAEA deems necessary to preserve, intact, all relevant information on safeguards until North Korea comes into full compliance.

DPRK's early full compliance would certainly serve not only its own best interest, but also the integrity and

objectives of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime under the NPT. We also renew our call for North Korea to abide by its undertakings under the Joint Declaration for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed in 1991 by the two parties.

The world is undergoing tremendous changes as the twenty-first century approaches. In the months and years ahead, we all have to put our wisdom and capabilities together to open up nuclear energy for wider applications for economic development and higher standards of living. The Republic of Korea pledges to play its due role in this important field.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.